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common law?
SUMMARY
The article embraces the question of competence of the Italian Council of State (Consiglio di Stato) 
in the light of orders referred to in Article 99 of the Italian Administrative Procedure Code. The Council 
of State is a consultative legal-administrative organ, which guarantees the legality of the public admin-
istration. It is considered a bastion of the rule of law. Therefore, the author asks questions regarding the 
transformation of the system of justice in administrative cases towards common law. Conclusion: the 
administrative jurisdiction applies its competences for the benefit and protection of a citizen. Based on 
Article 99 of the Administrative Procedure Code, the mechanism consisting in applying the precedential 
practice imposes the forms of institutional cooperation in the administrative jurisdiction system. The 
author claims that a binding precedent is fully consistent with the principle of the rule of law and legality.
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INTRODUCTION
Article 99 of the Italian Administrative Procedure Code approved by the legisla-
tive decree 104/2010 assigns a new role to the Plenary Session of the State Council. 
In particular, the third paragraph of Article 99 prescribes that if the section of the 
Council of State, which is assigned the appeal, believes that it does not share a “rule” 
laid down by the Plenary Session, transfer to the latter, by reasoned order, the decision 
of the appeal. It is a constraint that has different nature from the binding rule created 
by the decision that produces effects “between the parties” (such in the case of res 
iudicata); as well as it is different from the constraint to which the remand judge 





is subject to when applying the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Cassation 
pursuant to Article 384 of the Civil Procedural Code. It is a role that goes far beyond 
the boundaries of the classic so-called nomofilactic function, whereby all apical 
jurisdiction shall ensure a uniform application of law although a binding de jure 
effect has been excluded (Article 45 of the old legislative statute No. 1054/1924 ).
Rather, the rule laid down by the Plenary Session resembles the rule of precedent 
typical of common law systems. Are we therefore faced with a transformation of 
administrative justice, traditionally considered the Italian bastion of the rule of law? 
Is the administrative process destined to become a process of common law?
If that were the case, Article 99 would introduce a novelty of undoubted impor-
tance. At a theoretical level, the skepticism against the creative role of the judiciary 
shall be subject to scrutiny. With regards to the Italian legal system, the consistency 
between Article 99 and some general principles of the rule of law shall be tested. 
With regards to the relationship between the citizen and the public administration, 
the positive impact of a binding precedent shall be assessed.
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
According to the doctrine of stare decisis, the elements defining a judicial 
precedent are the following:
a) a judicial decision, in addition to solving a given case, also represents an autho-
ritative source of law to follow in subsequent cases that have some similarity1,
b) a court is bound to follow the decisions of higher courts and sometimes its 
own decisions2,
c) a decision is binding only as regards to its ratio decidendi,
d) an old precedent, although still valid, might not be applicable where signi-
ficant changes have occurred,
e) the judge of the subsequent case analyzes critically the precedent and retains 
some freedom to interpret the ratio decidendi to such extent as to be able to 
decide the new case disregarding the precedent,
f) the technique of the overruling, designed to replace an old precedent, pre-
vents that a unexpected change of the rule laid down in the precedent may 
undermine the expectations of those who have relied on the rule itself.
On a substantive level, the precedent is a means to create law. On a procedural 
level, the precedent is a special technique of dispute resolution.
1 For the variations of the common law in the U.S. see: R. Pound, The deviation of American 
Law from English Law, “Law Quarterly Review” 1952, Vol. 67, pp. 44–46.
2 The Supreme Courts of the United States, unlike English courts, have not deemed to be bound 
by their own precedents. R. David, I grandi sistemi giuridici contemporanei (a cura di Sacco), Padova 
1973, p. 373.
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ARGUMENTS CONTRARY TO THE BINDING NATURE 
OF THE PRECEDENT (IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS)
In Italy, the doctrine of the precedent as a source of law has been subject to harsh 
criticism, both on formal grounds (the list of sources of law does not include judge-
-made law), on political grounds (based primarily on the principle of separation of 
powers), and on the argument that a judge creating law could invade and erode the 
powers where the sovereignty lies (once of the King, and today of the Parliament).
On the contrary, it seems unquestioned that the Constitution requires the ju-
diciary to apply the law (Article 101 § 2) and not to create it3. The common law 
assumptions are therefore rejected. The dogmatic construction of the system of the 
sources of law has been influenced by the 19th-century legal positivism, inspired 
by the myth of the self-sufficiency of the legislative power and hostile to the idea 
of the creative power of the judge.
However, as facts have proved over time, no ideology has been able to prevent 
that judges consciously created new law4.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE BINDING PRECEDENT  
(IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS)
1. Theoretical arguments
In the early 1900s, scholars adhering to the legal realism acknowledge that 
law expresses itself also through judicial activity. Challenging the monopoly of 
statutory law, the merit of legal realists has been to innovate the legal debate es-
pecially with regards to the system of the sources of law5.
The impact of realists is undoubted. Not surprisingly, even our doctrine has 
subsequently shown to abandon the traditional scheme of 19th-century legal dog-
matic. Such a claim is even stronger for the administrative judge, if we consider 
the massive and conscious creative work carried out by the Council of State 
throughout history.
3 R. Guastini, Il giudice e la legge, Torino 1995.
4 G. Tarello, Storia della cultura giuridica moderna, Bologna 1976.
5 R. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, New Haven 1922; B.N. Cardozo, Selected 
Writings of Benjamin Cardozo (Il giudice e il diritto), New York, 1947 (trad. it. Firenze, La Nuova 
Italia 1961); A. Ross, On Law and Justice (Diritto e giustizia), Torino 1965; K. Olivecrona, La Law 
as Fact, London 1939; idem, Il diritto come fatto, Milano 1967.





The administrative case law has been mainly carried out through a creative 
activity of the judiciary. Statutory law followed judicial decisions6. The techniques 
by which the administrative judge analyses the “excess of power” are by defi-
nition independent of any specific statutory rule and refer to general standards or 
principles (such as reasonableness, etc.), the application of which imply a broad 
discretionary power by the court7. By a clear rule of law, the administrative court 
shall ensure “full and effective protection” according to “the principles of European 
law” (Article 1 of the Italian Administrative Procedure Code)8.
In summary, if there is room – as it seems the case – for the civil court to 
“create” rules and fill in the gaps of the legislator or interpret the spirit over the 
letter of a statute, a far more significant room exists for the administrative court, 
because of the kind of actions it takes and of its power to ensure justice. The real 
novelty would consist in the binding effect of the precedent laid down by the Ple-
nary Session on the individual sections. This aspect, however, would be a logical 
consequence of the above premises. A judge unstoppably creator of law, such 
as the administrative judge, can be bound by precedents of the Plenary Session.
2. Political arguments
The first argument typically mentioned in favour of the binding precedent is 
legal certainty9, a fundamental value that underpins any orderly community. In 
particular, the precedent is a tool to protect the expectations of citizens and as 
such a guarantee of greater liberty. The stare decisis, in fact, allows to predict in 
advance the behaviours sanctioned by law and plan your life choices accordingly. 
The ECHR has stressed the relevance of predictability10. Within the purposes of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the notion of “law” is not linked to 
formal or procedural criteria. The European Court of Human Rights has developed, 
vis à vis all States, an “autonomous notion” of law, compatible with all European 
constitutional systems. Pursuant to the European Court, the univocity, consisten-
6 See: S. Cassese, Problemi delle ideologie dei giudici, [in:] Studi in memoria di Carlo Esposito, 
Padova 1972, p. 1392 ff. Cfr. also M. Nigro, Giustizia amministrativa, Bologna 1983, p. 326 ff.
7 See: F. Patroni Griffi, La sentenza amministrativa, [in:] Trattato di diritto amministrativo, 
a cura di S. Cassese, tomo V, Milano 2003, p. 4468.
8 Court of Justice of the European Union, October 6, 1982, causa C-283/81, Cilfit srl e Lani- 
ficio di Gavardo spa c. Ministero della Sanità, in Racc., 1982, 3415; adde Court of Justice of the 
European Union, September 15, 2005, causa C-495/03, Intermodal Transports BV c. Staatssecretaris 
van Financiën, Racc., 2005, I-8151.
9 G. Lamond, Precedent and analogy in legal reasoning, [in:] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy, 2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/legal-reas-prec [access: 10.02.2018].
10 Sunday Times c. Regno Unito, decision April 29, 1979, §§ 48–49. As a consequence, the Court 
claims that the “law” is not knowable, and predictable, if the case law is contradictory and questioned 
(please note that the reasoning is the same for both common law systems and those of civil law).
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cy, intelligibility, and predictability of law are evidence of the effectiveness of 
the rule of law at a national level. Therefore, in the eyes of the Court, the “law” 
is not knowable or predictable if the law is often challenged and contradictory11.
Furthermore, predictability guarantees the liberty of citizens also in another way. 
The stare decisis sets forth stronger and more precise limits of the discretionary 
power of public officials, so that they may be held accountable where they have 
issued enactments in violations of the rules laid down in the precedents.
The stare decisis can be as well supported for reasons of efficiency. If courts 
are altogether consistent, rules are clearer and reasons for conflict decrease. The 
result is a deflation of litigation and processes.
The argument of predictability is intertwined with that of legal certainty. There-
fore, if on the one hand the precedent seems to hinder the principle of the rule of 
law as it implies the recognition of a creative power of the judge, on the other 
hand, it serves to one of the functions that the principle of the rule of law aims at 
promoting, i.e., protecting citizens from arbitrary and unpredictable behaviour of 
the public authorities. Legal scholars have already stated that the rule of stare de-
cisis is not only contrary to the principle of “rule of law”, but it is actually its own 
corollary12.
3. Logical-textual arguments
On a strictly exegetic level, the very same formulation of the rule betrays the 
intention of the legislator to introduce into the legal system the binding precedent.
1. Article 99 § 3 of the code of the administrative process contains a prescrip-
tive a not merely descriptive proposition13. The proposition “If the section 
does not share a rule of law laid down by the Plenary Session, transfer to the 
latter the decision by a reasoned order” means that “the section that doesn’t 
share a rule of law cannot decide the case but must put it back to the Plenary 
Session by explaining the reasons for dissent”. It cannot mean, however, 
that “the section that doesn’t share the rule of law of the Plenary Session 
is free to depart from it, provided that it gives reasons”. Where intended in 
this last way, the formulation would be superfluous.
11 Explicit in this respect are the judgments that have defined the actions Kruslin c. Francia, April 
24, 1990 §§ 27–36; Kopp c. Svizzera, March 25, 1998 § 73; Valenzuela Contreras c. Spagna, July 
30, 1999 § 52 ff., about art. 7 Conv., Kokkinakis c. Grecia, May 25, 1993 § 40; Cantoni c. Francia, 
November 15, 1996 § 28 ff.; Achour c. Francia, March 29, 2006 § 49 ff.; Pessino c. Francia, October 
10, 2006 § 28.
12 J. Waldron, Judges Judges as Moral Reasoners, “International Journal of Constitutional Law” 
2009, Vol. 7(2).
13 N. Bobbio, Teoria generale del diritto, Torino 1993, p. 52 ff.





2. The verbal predicate “transfer” does not imply a faculty. The norm is not 
formulated as if the transfer were a mere faculty of the simple sections: it is 
not written “can transfer”.
3. The prescriptive nature of the rule could also be inferred from the duty to 
provide reasons borne by the simple section where it believes not to share the 
rule of law laid down by the Plenary Session: duty which resembles the simi-
lar duty of the a quo judge which intends to raise a question of constitutional 
legitimacy by deferring the case to the Constitutional Court.
4. The circumstance that no sanction is provided for the case where the simple 
session decides not to transfer the case to the Plenary Session and issues an 
autonomous opinion is not conclusive in denying the prescriptive nature of 
Article 99. Rules of structure (such as those that regulate the functioning of an 
institution) are rarely accompanied by a sanction but are nevertheless binding14.
5. Finally, pursuant to Articles 74 and 88 of the Italian Administrative Procedure 
Code, the judge may fulfill his duty to give reasons by simply referring to 
a precedent (which shall obviously be on the same issue). According to our 
reasoning, such a precedent shall be the rule laid down by the Plenary Session.
6. The framework above described could not be easily reduced to the nomofilactic 
function of the Plenary Session.
THE ACTUALITY OF DEBATE
The awareness of the existence of a binding precedent emerges from the Consiglio 
di Giustizia Amministrativa per la Regione Sicilia (Council of Administrative Justice 
for the Region of Sicily) decision of 26 September 201315 with which the Italian ad-
ministrative Judge made a request for a preliminary ruling to the EU Court of Justice 
concerning the trial rules which must be followed for analysing a cross-claim and the 
principles of effectiveness and the primacy of EU law.
The main question is ascertaining whether Article 267 TFEU is to be interpreted 
as precluding a provision of national law, in so far as that provision is interpreted 
to the effect that, where a question concerning the interpretation or validity of EU 
law arises, a chamber of a court of final instance must, if it does not concur with the 
position adopted by decision of that court sitting in plenary session, refer the question 
to the plenary session and is thus precluded from itself making a request to the Court 
of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
Article 99 of the Italian Administrative Procedure Code provides as follows:
14 Ibidem, p. 58.
15 See: www.giustizia-amministrativa.it [access: 10.02.2018].
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1. Where the Chamber to which the appeal is assigned considers that the point of law submitted for 
its consideration has given rise, or might give rise, to divergences in judicial decisions, it may, by order 
made on application by one of the parties or of its own motion, refer the case to be heard by the court in 
plenary session. The plenary session may, if it deems appropriate, refer the matter back to the Chamber.
2. Before a decision is delivered, the President of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) may, on 
application by one of the parties or of his own motion, refer any appeal to the court in plenary session 
for a ruling on questions of principle of particular importance or with a view to resolving divergences 
in judicial decisions.
3. If the Chamber to which the appeal is assigned does not concur with a principle of law stated by 
the plenary session, it shall, by reasoned order, refer the decision on the appeal to the plenary session […].
In the light of the Article 99 the Italian Judge has asked:
In the event that doubts arise as to whether a principle of law already stated by the Consiglio 
di Stato (Council of State) in plenary session is in conformity with or is compatible with EU law, is 
the Chamber or Division of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) to which the case is assigned 
under an obligation to make a reasoned order referring the decision on the appeal back to the plenary 
session, even before it is able to make a request to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling as 
to whether the principle of law in question is in conformity with or is compatible with EU law; or, 
instead, may – or, rather, must – the Chamber or Division of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State), 
being a national court against whose decisions no appeal lies, independently refer – as an ordinary 
court applying EU law – a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling so as to obtain 
the correct interpretation of EU law?
It is not a case that the bond of precedent is intended to cede only where the 
relative applications end up to elude the Community law: principle stated by the 
CJEU16 whose judgment confirms the theoretical system of the binding precedent for 
future decisions. Indeed, even though the lien would not be binding on a domestic 
level, would have not sense the Community Judge statement that broke the case 
raised by the Italian Administrative Judge when referral was requested concerning 
the possibility that the direct application of EU law and in particular the Article 
267 TFEU crashes with the Article 99 § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Code.
The debate shows all his actuality as the scholars17 and administrative decisions 
prove18. The strength of binding precedent is intended to outline the trial rules in 
the administrative sector so long that Article 99 § 3 of the Administrative Procedure 
Code stretch out a common law model, focused on the stare decisis rule.
16 EUCJ (Grand Chamber), April 5, 2016, C-689/13.
17 R. Rordorf, Nomofilachia e precedente giudiziario: Il precedente nella giurisprudenza, “Il Foro 
italiano” 2017, n. 1, p. 277; A. Proto Pisani, Tre note sui «precedenti» nella evoluzione della giuris-
prudenza della Corte costituzionale, nella giurisprudenza di una Corte di cassazione necessariamente 
ristrutturata e nella interpretazione delle norme processuali, “Il Foro italiano” 2017, n. 9, p. 295; 
G. Pesce, L’Adunanza plenaria del Consiglio di Stato e il vincolo del precedente, Napoli 2012.
18 With decision of the Section IV No. 3805/2017 the State Council has asked to the Plenary 
Session to affirm whether, and in what extent, the principles from it enunciated can apply the “au-






By acknowledging the doctrine of the stare decisis within our administrative 
justice some theoretical and legal puzzles shall be addressed19. Some have mainly 
a logical nature and as such predominantly tickle legal theorists: if judges are free 
to create law, why should the subsequent judge be bound by a precedent? In which 
occasions (and upon which circumstances) is the judge free in a way similar to the 
legislator, and when on the contrary is he bound?
Legal puzzles aren’t easier. The Italian system of the sources of law is usually 
deemed to be closed and structured according to hierarchical and competence criteria.
And what about the rule of law? The rule of law, as set forth under Article 101 
of the Italian Constitution  (the judge is subject only to law) implies that a judge 
shall disregard a precedent which he deems contrary to law: for he has a duty to 
obey the law and not his colleague (including the Supreme Court of Cassation and 
the Plenary Session of the State Council) who laid down the rule of precedent. 
The contradiction, however, is more apparent than real. The judge who creates 
new law does not act in a vacuum but within a framework of standards and rules20. 
As a result, the binding precedent is fully consistent with the rule of law and the 
principle of legality21.
To follow J. Waldron the concept of the rule of law shall be captured under 
a layered approach: so that a judge sets forth a rule within a more general statutory 
framework and a subsequent judge continues in the work of defining the general 
rule to tailor it to specific empirical circumstances and so on.
As a last point. The analysis is confined to the administrative justice and as 
a result the dangerous specter of a powerful creator judge shall be dispelled: such 
a specter either comes under the appearance of the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
(where there is the suspicions that democracy is in danger) or under the much 
darker cloths of the inquisitor judge. The administrative justice, however, is much 
different than the criminal justice: if, as is often the case, the discretionary power 
of the judge is used in favor of the private citizen, the risk denounced by Beccaria 
and Montesquieu is averted.
thority of a final decision”, and, therefore, in what measure with reference to said principle, can apply 
once the hypothesis of “revision” that the same resulted “not applied” from the Section, that has not 
prepared the delay instead to the senses of the Article 99, § 3, of the Administrative Procedure Code. 
Finally, the Plenary Session of State Council No. 2/2018 declare that from Article 99 § 3 of Italian 
Administrative Procedure born a “binding precedent”.
19 G. Pesce, op. cit.
20 S. Cassese, I Tribunali di Babele (I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale), Roma 
2009, pp. 103 ff.
21 J. Waldron, Stare decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, [in:] Public Law & Legal 
theory research paper sciences, NYU School of Law, October 2011.
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The system where the precedent is binding is not necessary that system where 
the judiciary power is omnipotent. The precedent is the Janus faced, which on the 
one hand raises the judge to the level of the legislator, on the other however binds 
him to his own decisions. It is, therefore, a mechanism which, rather than fostering 
individualistic attitudes, imposes forms of institutional cooperation and therefore 
of natural modesty.
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STRESZCZENIE
Artykuł obejmuje problematykę kompetencji włoskiej Rady Stanu (Consiglio di Stato) w świetle 
postanowień art. 99 kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego. Rada Stanu jest organem konsulta-
cyjnym prawno-administracyjnym i zapewnia legalność administracji publicznej. Uznawana jest za 
bastion rządów prawa. Wobec powyższego autor zadaje pytania dotyczące przekształcenia wymiaru 
sprawiedliwości w sprawach administracyjnych w kierunku procesu common law. Konkluzja: są-
downictwo administracyjne wykorzystuje swoje kompetencje w kierunku ochrony i korzyści oby-
watela. Mechanizm polegający na wykorzystaniu praktyki precedensowej, mający swoje podstawy 
w art. 99 kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego, narzuca formy współpracy instytucjonalnej 
w sądownictwie administracyjnym. Autor uważa, że wiążący precedens jest w pełni zgodny z zasadą 
praworządności i legalności.
Słowa kluczowe: Rada Stanu; precedens; postępowanie administracyjne
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